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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
TROY 0. NANCE, and
THOMAS B. HANLEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
and Cross-Appellants,
vs.
SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, an
unincorporated association,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 9111

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT

This is an action 'to set aside the expulsion of
two members from membership in the defendant
union. The proceeding was originally instituted by
plaintiff Nance by filing a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel defendant to vacate and set
aside his expulsion. Plain tiff Hanley was perm'i'tted
to intervene in the action seeking the same relief
1
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with respect to his own expulsion. In order to avoid
confusion we shall hereafter refer to Nance and
Han ley either by name or as plaintiffs, and shall
refer to appellant Sheet Metal Workers International Association either as the union or as defendant.
1

The action was 'tried in two phases, the first
before the court sitting without a jury and the
second before a jury. The first related to the legality
of the expulsion and the right to recover exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. The second, that tried
before a jury, related to the right of plaintiffs to
re-cover compensatory damages and punitive damages after expulsion.
At the conclusion of the taking of evidence on
the isues tried before the court without a jury, the
court on December 30, 1958, rendered a Memorandum of Decision finding that plaintiffs had been
wrongfully expelled. This Memorandum of Decision
is printed on Pages 1 to 10 of the appendix to
this brief. The court fo'Ilowed this decision by a
Supplemental Memorandum of Decision on January
9, 1959, which is printed on Pages 11 to 12 of the
appendix to this brief. Although finding that plaintiffs had been wrongfully expelled, the court postponed decision on the issues whether the defendant
had acted wilfully and maliciously and whether as
a consequence thereof plaintiffs were entitled tore2
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cover punitive and exemplary damages and attorneys fees pending trial of the issues to be tried before the jury.
On January 13, 1959, a pre-trial conference
was held regarding procedure in connection with
presentation of issues to the jury. The court referred to the demand for jury filed by plaintiffs
and the stipulation between the parties at the pretrials prior to the commencement of the trial to
the effect that the court should determine the legality of the expulsions without a jury, and raised
the question as to whether the stipulation was intended to cover trial of the issue as to exemplary
damages for wrongful expulsion by the court without a jury as it did not appear to be clearly covered
by the prior stipulations of the parties (Pre-T.
1-13-59, p. 2). Counsel for defendant then raised
the question as to whether the jury would be a common law jury or only an advisory jury (ibid, p. 4)
Defendant contended that the jury would be advisory only (ibid, pp. 22-23, 33-34, 62-63), that
the issue of the expulsion and reinstatement was
properly tried by the court (ibid, p. 25) and that
defendant had never made a demand for a jury
in the case (ibid, p. 29). The court then suggested
a stipulation by counsel to clarify the trial by the
court of the issue as to exemplary damages for
wrongful expulsion and to avoid repetition before
3
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the jury of evidence theretofore presented to the
court (ibid, pp. 9-12). After a recess, defendant
refused to so stipulate unless the court first gave
its decision as to malice and bad faith in the expulsion (ibid, pp. 36-37).
On January 14, 1959, the court submitted a
form of stipulation to counsel with the request that
they notify the court by January 19 whether it
\Vould be agreeable (R. 355-358). Plaintiffs agreed
to the stipulation ( R. 359), but defendant declined
to do so and consented to trial by jury "as if trial
by jury had been a matter of right upon all issues
not heretofore decided by the court" ( R. 360). On
January 21, 1959, the court entered its Order as
to Issues to be Submitted to Jury which is printed
in full at pages 13 to 17 of the appendix to this
brief. After a recital of the facts, the court stated
in this order that the situation thus called for a
ruling as to whether the defendant was entitled to
have a jury trial of the issues (a) as to alleged
malice or bad faith on the part of defendant's officers in bringing about the expulsion, and (b) as
to whether exemplary damages should be awarded
for such conduct and if so the amount of same. The
court then ruled that defendant "is not now entitled
to demand a jury trial" as to such issues and "that
the court shall decide the aforesaid issues after
evidence is completed in the case", and that only
4
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the issues as to whether plaintiffs suffered actual
damages as a result of the expulsion and \vhether
they were entitled to exemplary damages for acts
of defendant or its officers and agents subsequent
to the expulsion should be submitted to the jury
(appendix, pp. 16-17).
The issues reserved for the jury were then
tried, and the jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. Thereafter plaintiffs filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
n1otion for a new trial, and both motions were denied. Concurrently with the filing of its order denying these motions, however, the court rendered a
second Supplemental Memorandum of Decision in
which it found among other things that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence; that plaintiffs had in fact suffered actual compensatory damages; that in expelling plaintiffs, defendant acted
wilfully and maliciously; and that p'laintiffs were
each entitled to recover nominal damages in the
sum of $1.00, exemplary damages in the sum of
$20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the sum of
$7,000.00. The Second Supplemental Memorandum
of Decision is dated May 2, 1959 and is printed on
Pages 18 to 34 of the appendix of this brief. Thereafter, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment were entered by the court in accordance
with the original Memordandum of Decision and
5
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the Second Supplemental Memorandum of Decision.
From that judgment, defendant has appealed. The
plaintiffs have cross appealed, chal'lenging the order
denying their motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new 'trial. The defendant
has filed its opening brief. This brief is submitted
in answer thereto and also in support of plaintiffs'
cross appeal.
INTRODUCTION

We cannot and do not agree with the statement
of facts contained in defendant's opening brief. Defendant states that probably most of the testimony
and documentary ~vidence in this long and tedious
case is surplusage. We believe, however, that a great
deal of the 'testimony and evidence produced by defendant was cumulative as well as surplusage. This
is indicated by the fact that on direct examination
the defendant cal'led 26 witnesses and the plaintiffs
only 8 witnesses in the trial before the court, and
that defendant called 18 witnesses and the plaintiff
only 6 witnesses in the trial before the jury. The
matter of needless accun1ulative evidence was referred to many times during 'the trial by the court.
Likewise, a great deal of the record is consumed
by incessant and repetitious objections and arguments by counsel for defendant which prolonged the
trial and lengthened the record. No references to the
transcript are necessary to support this statement,
6
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inasnn1ch as it will be supported by turning at randum to allmost any volume of the transcript. The
record is so voluminous that it is impossible to 1·efer
to all rna terial parts and i't would be an in1 position
on the justices of this court to ask them to read all
such references.
The plaintiffs were expelled after trials held
in their absence on charges that they had violated
various provisions of defendant's constitution and
ritual. They were given no opportunity to call ·witnesses or adduce evidence in their defense, or to
cross examine witnesses cal'led against 'them, although these rights were guaranteed to them by defendant's own constitution. ( Exh. 53, Art. 18, Sec.
2 (e)). The defendant seeks to justify this highhanded p1·ocedure by asserting that plaintiffs had
refused to stand trial. But the court below found
to the contrary after a consideration of all of the
evidence, hundreds of pages of which concern the
union trial hearings and explain and supplement
the transcript of the proceedings printed in the appendix to defendant's brief. In this connection~ the
court found as follows in i'ts findings No. 13 to 17
( R. 644-645) :
13. That neither the petitioner nor the
intervenor at any time refused to stand trial
upon the said charges preferred against them;
that neither of them at any time either by
words or conduct consented to trial of said
charges in his absence, but on the contrary
7
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each of them informed the trial board of his
desire to be present and to present evidence
in refutation of such charges.
14. That neither the petitioner nor the
intervenor nor any person authorized to speak
or act for them or either of them conducted
himself in such a way as to justify the trial
committee in trying them or either of 'them in
absentia ; tha't the evidence presented as to
conduct of the petitioner and intervenor and
other persons a't open hearings conducted by
the trial committee on June 3, 4, and 7, 1954,
does not show any violence or threat of violence or any disturbance of the peace at said
sessions of the trial committee; that police
officers were present in the hearing room at
each of said sessions and they were ready
and able to prevent any violence or disturbance of the peace; that protests and objections made by the petitioner and interve:qo~
at said open hearings were not so lacking in
merit as to constitute or to be construed as
a refusal to stand trial or as a waiver of trial
or to justify the 'trial board in ordering them
or either of them to be tried in absentia.
15. That the trial committee wrongfully and without reasonable justification or
excuse and ·without giving either the petitioner or intervenor opportunity to be present or
to hear the evidence against them or crossexamine witnesses or to present evidence in
their own behalf, proceeded to hear witnesses
and to receive evidence produced by the General President and his counsel and thereafter
rendered decisions declaring that each and an
of the charges preferred against the petitioner and intervenor, respectively, by the Gen8
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eral President wel'e true and that the petitioner and intervenor should each be expelled
from me1nbership in the respondent association.
16. That a purported tria 1 of the
charges against the petitioner Nance was held
in Room 1003 of the Statler Hotel in Los Angeles on Thursday, June 10, 1954; that petitioner was not present and had no notice or
knowledge of the room where said trial was
held nor any notice or knowledge of the ti1ne
of said 'trial except by the notice shown at
page 4 of Defendant's Exhibit 6 which was
read at the sessi'on of the trial committee on
June 7, 1954; that at said session and subsequent to the reading of said notice the chairman of the trial commi'tee announced that
the petitioner and intervenor wou ld be tried
in absentia.
17. That a purported trial of the
charges against the intervenor Hanley was
had by the trial committee on Tuesday, June
8, 1954, as shown by Defendant's Exhibit 7
herein; that the intervenor had no notice of
such trial but had been notified by the trial
committee as shown at page 3 of said Exhibit
7 and at page 4 of said Exhibit 6 that his trial
would be held Wednesday, June 9, 1954, or
as soon thereafter as the trial of petitioner
Nance was completed; that the purported trial
of the charges against the intervenor was held
on 'the day prior to the time specified in the
notice read to him, and the intervenor had no
notice or knowledge as 'to the time when or
place where said trial was held except the
notice above mentioned; that subsequent to
the reading of said notice on June 7, 1954,
1

9
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the chairman of the trial committee announced that the petitioner and intervenor would
be tried in absentia.
These findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence as the foUowing statement of
facts and summary of the evidence will show.
FACTS PRECEDING UNION CHARGES

Defendant is an international labor organization having local unions throughout the United
States and Canada. It is governed by a General
Executive Council composed of ( 1) a general president (who is the executive head of the organization), (2) a general secretary-treasurer and (3)
eleven general vice presidents. (Exh. 53, Art. 6).
Although the defendant's constitution provides that
these general officers shall be elected at a convention held every four years, no general officer has
been originally so elected, each convention having
silnply reelected the officers then in office who have
been unopposed. ( NJT 3202-3205, 3511). Vacancies
occurring between conventions have been filled by
the general executive council, which has thus constituted itself a self-perpetuating body. (ibid.).
During all times material to this litigation, defendant's general president was one Robert Byron
( NJT 2860). He was a man of advanced years, being at the time of trial 78 years of age (ibid.). He
had been connected with the defendant's organiza10
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tion in one capacity or another for more than fifty
years, and had held the office of general president
since 1939 (NJT 35, 3202). Defendant's general
secretary-treasurer was one Edward C a r 1 o u g h
(ibid.). Its eleven general vice presidents were .A..
II. Cronin, Rene Schroeder, Moe Rosen, Marion
Macioce, J. R. Dietz, Jacob Baer, J. 0. Renaud, G.
Joseph Fitzgerald, James J. Ryan, James E. Brooks
and C. D. Bruns (NJT 35-40). Of all of defendant's
general officers, only Schroeder and Fitzgerald were
residents of states West of the Missisippi RiYer,
the former being a resident of Houston, Texas and
the latter a resident of San Francisco (ibid.).
Becoming dissatisfied with 'the policies and
practices of the defendant, and with the disproportionate1ly large representation of the Northeastern
part of the United States on defendant's general
executive council, a group of members started a
movement early in 1953, first, to retire Byron as
general president at full pay, and secondly, to change
the method of electing general vice presidents so
that they would be elected by a referendum vote of
local unions on a regional basis (NJT 134-137, Exh.
12 to 15). The proponents of these changes proposed
to endeavor to have them adopted at the defendant's
next general convention scheduled to be held in
August, 1954. If the changes were adopted, not only
would Byron be removed as the active head of the
11
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defendant, but most of defendant's general vice
presidents would be ousted from office. (ibid.).
La'te in January, 1954, Byron summoned plaintiff Hanley to meet him in Miami ( N JT 41). At that
thne Hanley was an international representative of
defendant in charge of California, Nevada and Arizona. Upon coming to Miami, Hanley met with Byron, Carlough and Cronin, first a't a meeting at
which all three were present together with other
officers and representatives of defendant, and subsequent:ly with each of them separately. At the mee'ting at which all were present, he was interrogated
at length by Cronin about the movement above decribed. Hanley stated that he understood some local
unions in his district were in favor of it. Cronin also
told Hanley there were rumors that he (Hanley)
intended to run against Byron for the office of general presiden't and asked him if there was any truth
in the rumors. Hanley denied that he had any intention of doing so. He was told that the administration (that is, the general officers then in office)
would tolera'te no opposition at the coming convention ( NJT 44-48). Both Byron and Cronin were
particular'ly bitter toward Carl Nichols (who was
the business manager of Local Union 108, at Los
Angeles, the largest of defendant's local unions in
the United States) and 'toward John Fuller (who
was the part 'time business agent of Local 371, an12
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other large local union in Los Angeles, and the administrator of the Sheet Metal Workers Welfare
Fund) whom they accused of having threatened to
oppose the general officers at the convention by
sponsoring the proposal to change the method of
electing general vice presidents, opposing the reelection of Byron, and otherwise opposing the existing regime (ibid. ) .
After this meeting, Byron met with Hanley and
requested him to prefer charges against Nichols
and Fuller so as to prevent them from coming to the
convention as delegates and even tried to induce
Hanley to take $2,000.00 for the purpose of having
Nichols assaulted (NJT 49-52). Cronin also met
with Hanley and told him that no opposition would
be tolerated at the convention, such as opposition
to the reelection of Byron and the vice presidential
amendment, and that if necessary to forestal 1 such
opposition all potential opponents would be expelled
(NJT 52-58). Carlough also met with Hanley, and
made statements of the same import (NJT 58-60,
64-66).
1

During the week of March 21, 1954, Hanley
along with all other international representatives
of the defendant, was in Washington to attend a
session of the general executive council (NJT 71-72).
On the 1ast day of the session, all of the international
representatives were called before the council. At
13
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the start of the meeting, Cronin called upon one
Roy James, an international representative from
Texas, to give a report as to rumors he had heard.
\Vhereupon James, pointing at Hanley, said that
he heard rumors that somebody in California was
supporting a move to change the vice presidents
and to bring about a lot of changes at the convention (NJT 73-79, 749-753). At the close of the meeting Hanley and Joseph Jarvis were asked to remain.
Both were interrogated by Byron in reference to
the plan to change the method of selecting vice presidents. Byron stated : "We in tend to knock this thing
out even if we have to expell everybody that's invo1ved", and "so far as Nichols is concerned, you can
look forward to his expulsion" ( NJT 79-80). Cronin
rnet with Hanley on two occassions after the close
of the session. In the first of these meetings, Cronin
offered to act as a conciliator to make peace between Byron and Hanley if Hanley would divorce
himself from the insurgent movement (NJT 81,
114-116). In the second meeting, at which Nichols
and several others were present, Cronin was shown
a draft of a map indicating the regions from which
the general vice presidents would be elected if the
proposed amendment to the constitution were adopted (NJT 116-120, 484-488). He expressed in
no uncertain terms the prophecy that any person
actively participating in the movement would be
14
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expelled (ibid.) . Two days after the close of the
meetings, Han ley was discharged as inte1·national
representative. (NJ.T 122-123, 2944).
1

On April 3, 195L1, a convention of the delegates
to the Tri-State Council was held at Phoenix, Arizona (NJT 124). [The Tri-State Council is an organization composed of all local unions of the defendant in the states of Arizona, California and
Nevada. Delegates to the Tri-State Council are elected by the various local unions in the three states
and officers of the council are elected by the delegates so chosen (NJT 123) .] At this convention
a resolution was adopted urging the adoption at the
next general convention of the resolution providing
for the retirement of Byron as President Emeritus
at full pay (NJT 131, Exh. 13). Hanley admittedly
was the originator of this resolution (NJT 4056).
The plan for the election of general vice presidents
on a regional basis was discussed among the delegates and a map showing the districts from which
the general vice presidents would be elected was
shown to the delegates (NJT 132). Although no
formal action was taken as to this, it was agreed
among the delegates that, on condition that Local
Union No. 108 (of which Nichols was the business
manager) would defray the cost, the resolution providing for the change of the method of selecting
vice presidents and maps showing the regions from
1
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which they would be elected should be sent to all
local unions (NJT 5597).
Hanley talked to the delegates at the meeting,
discussed the maps and resolutions and reported
on the discusion at the recent meeting of the general
executive council in Washington. G. Joseph Fitzgerald, a general vice president who later served on
the trial board, spoke in opposition to the resolutions and stated that anyone who supported them
\Vould only get in trouble (NJT 175-180, 55935596).
Within two weeks thereafter, between the 18th
and 21st of April, 1954, Byron called a special session of the General Executive Council at Washington, D. C. (NJT 3466, 3856, 5147). At this session,
at which all of the general vice presidents were in
attendance Byron announced that charges looking
to the expulsion of Hanley, Nance, Nichols, Say and
Fuller would be prepared and asked which of the
general vice presidents would be agreeable to serving on a trial board (ibid.) . Cronin and one\'Qr~ two
other general vice presidents declined to serve in
that capacity (ibid.).
Following the meeting of the General Executive Council, Byron journeyed to Los Angeles, and
there spoke to, among others, Charles Willia:lns (a
member of the Executive Board of Local Union No.
88 in Las Vegas, Nevada) and to William Hanson (a
16
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former business agent of Local Union No. 371 in
Los Angeles). l-Ie told both of them that Hanley and
Nance ·were going to be expelled, and that their expulsion was inevitable because of their participation
to retire him (Byron) and to change the system of
selecting General Vice Presidents (NJT 1754, 1756,
1803). Thus, Hanson testified with respect to his
conversation with Byron (NJT 1802-1803):
A. Well, President Byron asked me to
come with him in to another rom, where he
could talk to me. So we stepped directly across
the hall and into another room, and he said:
'Well," he said Q. Who was present now?
A. Just President Byron and myself.
Q. All right. State the conversation.
A. President Byron then said that He said: "Well, I found out al'l about the maps
and the resolutions, and all this other stuff/'
that Tom and Nick and them has been circulating. And he seemed very upset about it.
MR. SAND RACK: Move to 'Strike: "He
seemed very upset about it."
THE COURT: That will be stricken.
A. And he asked me, he said: "First of
all I want to come to an understanding with
you." He said: "I understand you want to go
back to work? Is that right?" and I said:
"Yes, I do. I have to work." He said: "Well,
I can see that you go back to work under certain conditions." He said: "First of all, are
17
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you going to be an administration man, or
aren't you?" and I said: "What do you mean
by that?" He said: "Well, are you going along
with the International, or are you going to
go along with Tom Hanley and those others,
and help support them?" So I said: "Well,
I have to work." I said: "I don't want to get
in to politics if I can keep out of it.'' ''Well,
then," he said: "in a few days I'll have an
affidavit drawn up that I want you to sign,"
and he said: "in the mean time you can go on
back to work." He said: "I have already fired
Hanley," and he said: "it looks like I'm going
to have to expell him." He said: "I hate to
do this, because he was the best International
Representative I have ever had." And he said:
"It just was a real shock to me to find out
these things. That he was circulating this
petition to retire me and so forth, and put in
these new resolutions that would put in a new
system of electing vice presidents."
William's testimony was to the same effect.
(NJT 1754 et. seq.).
That Byron was interested in and had his field
lieutenants busy combating the movement to amend
the constitution is shown by the following report
of his investigator Stetter regarding a proposed
meeting of Local Union No. 108 to be held on April
13, 1954 (NJT 5328, line 27 to 5329, line 13):
"Murphy also advised that there will be
a move made by Tom Hanley and his crowd
to take over the meeting to be held Tuesday
evening and to try to force General President
Byron to resign. Murphy also adVised that
18
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C. C. Artman, International Representati\·e,
is lining up substantial opposition to any action by Hanley; in Yiew of the temper of
both sides there is a good possibility of Yiolence and even bloodshed. . . . O'Malley also
advised that the members in Artman's ca1np
are going to the meeting with the intention
of fighting Hanley to the point that there
will be btoodshed if need be. These men have
informed O'Malley that they are going to object to Hanley talking, and that when the
Hanley faction tries to oppose their wishes
they intend to resort to whatever force is
necessary to see to it that Hanley does not
get to talk.''
General Secretary-Treasurer Carlough was also
interested in the plan to retire Byron and the maps
designating the regions from which the vice presidents would be elected, as Stetter admitted on crossexamination that Carlough asked him if he had heard
anything regarding the maps in Los Angeles immediately after he returned to Washington on May
2, 1954 (NJT 5350).
THE CHARGES AND PURPORTED UNION TRIALS

On May 15, 1954, Byron mailed to Hanley and
Nance letters charging them with violations of various provisions of defendant's constitution and ordering them to stand trial before a trial board to
be selected by him at the Statler Hotel in Los Angeles, California. Hanley was directed to appear
for trial on June 3, 1954 and Nance, along with three
19
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other members, on the following day (Ex. 30, pp.
21-28). Owing to his absence from Las Vegas (where
he resided) Han ley never received the letter preferring the charges against him ( NJT 181). He
\vas, however, notified by Nichols by telephone that
such charges had been preferred and saw a copy
of them sometime around May 25, 1954 (NJT 181182, Exh. 16). Nance received the letter preferring
the charges against him on or about May 18, 1954
(NJT 1428, Ex. 49).
Defendant maintained below and repeats in its
brief in this court that the charges preferred against
the plaintiffs were the result of:
(a) Complaints made to Byron by Henry Ely
and Ira Fulmor (the secretary of a contractors' association and a Los Angeles contractor, respectively)
of "shake downs and strikes called for extortionate
purposes" ; and
(b) Reports made to Byron by an investigator, one Grant Stetter, whom defendant alleges was
hired as a result of the aforesaid complaint, to the
effect that "Han'ley, Nichols, Fuller, and to a lesser
extent Nance and Eugene Say" had engaged in
"gross misconduct" including such matters as "intimidation of local union members, rigged union elections, extortions and even physical coercion and
intimidation of contractors".
That defendant's contention in this behalf can1

20
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not be sustained is demonstrated by the fact that
neither Nance nor Hanley vvas charged \vith "shake
downs and strikes called for extortionate purposes".
Nor was either of them charged with "intimidation
of local union n1embers, rigged union elections, extortions, or physical coercion or intimidation of contractors." The principal charge against Nance vvas
that he had circulated certain bulletins critical of
defendant's general officers accusing them of misusing union funds for gambling and other improper
purposes. He was also accused of refusing to turn
over upon demand certain union books and records
and an automobile (Exh. 47). But nowhere in the
charges against Nance is any reference to shake
downs, etc., as claimed by defendant. Nor is there
any reference to any such matters in the charges
against Hanley. Indeed, the charges against Hanley,
which are set forth on pages 56 to 60 of the appendix to defendant's brief, are of such nature that,
while they might justify his discharge from the
position of international representative, would not
justify his expulsion from membership in the defendant union. As for the reports of the investigator Stetter, there is good reason to believe that he
was employed, not to conduct an impartial and unbiased investigation as defenedant would have the
court believe, but to obtain evidence to justify plaintiffs' expulsion which defendant had already deter21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n1ined to effect. This is shown not only by the fact
that as early as April 1954, Byron had announced
at a special executive council meeting that charges
would be preferred against plaintiffs, whereas the
investigator did not make his final report until May
8, 1954, but also by the following excerpts from the
investigator's reports (NJT 5346):
"Mr. John O'Mal1ey, our associate in Los
Angeles, California was also contacted by telephone and he advised that reasonable progress
is being made to establish shake down activities by Nichols. He was instructed to handle
these interviews which were already scheduled, but to concentrate on obtaining affidavits or signed statements concerning Hanley's illegal activities."
Although prepared by defendant's general
counsel, the charges were, especially in the case of
Hanley, framed in the most general terms conceivable. As said before, Hanley never received the
charges mailed to hhn by Byron, although he did
see and obtain a copy of them indirectly sometime
between May 25, and May 27, 1954. Upon learning
of the charges, he wrote a letter to Byron on May
29, 1954 (Exh. 17) requesting a continuance. The
letter read in part as follows:
"Not having received a copy of the
charges, due to the fact that I have not been
in Las Vegas for more than two weeks and
my family has been on vacation, I would na22
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tura'lly be unable to defend such charges at
the tin1e and place designated by you. I would,
therefore, request that you as General President, in accordance with Article 18, Section
3 of the International Constitution and Ritual, furnish me with a copy of said charges
by forwarding the same to me at Post Office
Box 786, Las Vegas, Nevada, or to the ~~lay
fair Hotel, Los Angeles, California, and upon
receipt of the same I will be governed by the
provisions of our International Constitution
relative to charges and trials by general officers."
A copy of this letter was sent to defendant's
genera1 secretary-treasurer and to each of its general vice-presidents.
In the meanwhile, Byron had appointed three
of defendant's general vice presidents to serve as a
trial board to try plaintiffs on the charges he had
preferred against them. They were Moe Rosen, Rene
Schroeder and G. Joseph Fitzgerald. Rosen was chosen as chairman of the board.
On June 2, 1954, Rosen replied to the letter
quoted from above by a telegram reading as follows (Exh. 19):
"Your trial will proceed at 10:00 A.M.
June 3, 1954 at the Statler Hotel , Los Angeles, California, as stated in notice sent you
by registered mail under date of May 15,
1954. Objections raised in your letter to Robert Byron dated May 29, 1954, may be submitted by you at your trial.
Moe Rosen,
Chairman Trial Board"
23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On June 3, 1954, Hanley and Nance appeared
at the room where the trial was to be held. The room
was approximately 16 by 20 feet in size, the larger
part of which was consumed by tables (NJT 2326).
\Vhen Nance and Hanley arrived the members of
the trial board, as well as several newspaper reporters and a number of spectators variously estimated
as numbering approximately 10 to 25, were present
( N JT 2330) . Three police officers in plain clothes,
including one Captain Joseph E. Stephens, were also
present ( N JT 2334). As testified to by Stephens,
''there was considerable discussion among the people
in the back of the room. It was not loud but it was
audible." (NJT 2336). At the start of the trial
Hanley renewed his application for a continuance
( Exh. 4, 20. 78). The motion was denied ( Exh. 4,
76). He also presented several written applications
for a clarification of the charges against him. This
application was never acted upon (Exh. 18).
The chairman of the trial board refused to
start the trial until the room was cleared of all
persons except Hanley, his counsel Eugene Vaughn,
the prosecutor Ernest Murphy, the n1embers of the
trial board, and two short-hand reporters. ( Exh. 4).
The spectators left during the morning session, and
the trial got under way by the chairman reading
charges and Hanley's objections and requests (Exh.
4, 67-83.). The trial then adjourned for lunch
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(ibid.). At the afternoon session Fuller, Nance and
Nichols, as well as Hanley, were present. The chairman refused to proceed until the first three indiYiduals left the romn ( Exh. 4, 84), and finally he adjourned the trial ( Exh. 4, 111).
Nance's trial, as well as the trials of three
othe1· union members, was scheduled for the follo\ving morning on June 4, 1954. Although Nance was
present, his case was never called for trial ( Exh.
5). Instead the trial board again recessed the trial
because the spectators present failed to heed the
chairman's request that the room be cleared of all
but the accused, his counsel, etc. (ibid.).
The trial board reconvened on Monday, June
7, 1954. At this time the chairman read into the
record notices to the effect that Fuller would stand
trial on June 7, 1954, that Nichols' trial would follow that of Fuller, that Nance would be tried on
June 8th and that Hanley would be tried on June
9th ( Exh. 6) . These notices were prepared over the
weekend by Murphy, attorney Mulhdlland and the
trial board after a conference with Byron under the
following circumstances as testified to by Murphy
(NJT 4742):
"Well, the trial had been going very badly, and, in confering with Mr. Byron, I went
to Mr. Fitzgerald and said that we would have
to get Monday's procedings off on a better
foot. I pointed out some errors they had been
25
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making in not reading some of these things
into the record. They therefore agreed to prepare the notices which are under question. Mr.
Schroeder and Mr. Rosen made sure in my
presence that they had the proper documents
to go to the proper people, and that I went
in with them, or behind them, and saw them
pass these documents out, and I knew they
had the right documents in their hands, and
that is the reason that I insisted at the opening of the procedure that these documents be
read in to the record.''
After reading the notices in to the record, the
chairman recessed the trials when the spectators
failed to leave the trial room ( Exh. 6, 17). He reconvened the session to announce that the accused
members would be tried in absentia. ( Exh. 6, 19).
At no time did the number of spectators in the
room exceed 25 ( NJT 2330, 2332, 2340, 2345, 2352).
At no time did the trial board ask the police present
to clear the room, although police officers were present during all three days when the so called trials
were in session. This is made clear by the following
testimony of Captain Stephens (NJT 2440):
BY THE COURT: ... referring to the
trial hearings on the 3rd, 4th and 7th of January . . . of June. Was any request made
of you by the chairman or any member of
the trial board to quell any disturbance in
the trial room?
ANSWER: My answer, your Honor,
was that no one asked me to remove any one
or quell any disturbance.
26
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THE COURT: Was any request made
of you to silence any boistrousness in the
room?
ANSWER: No sir.
THE COURT: Was any request made
of you to take any action? I mean any request
made by any member of the trial board to take
any action?
ANSWER: I testified, I think, your
Honor, that the point, the question was raised
by the chairman as to whether THE COURT: Well, but was any request 1nade to you?
ANSWER: No sir.
THE COURT: To do anything?
ANSWER: No sir.
Stephens also testified that he was not requested by anyone to be present at any of the sessions
(NJT 2351-2352).
Neither Nance nor Hanley was responsible for
the presence of the spectators. (NJT 304, 1448). All
of them were apparently members of defendant's
Local Union No. 108 and hence interested in the
trials, especially in view of the fact that their local
had recently been taken over by Byron for the International (NJT 2348-2350, 5619, 5637-5638). Defendant refers to the testimony of John Fuller regarding a purported conspiracy to sabatoge the
trials, and states that his testimony was evidently not credited by the court. It is clear from the
court's findings that it did not give any credence
27
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to his testimony, and as a matter of fact, his testiInony was so contradictory and he was so completely
discredited in his cross-examination that his entire
testimony could be completely ignored.
The evidence shows that the trial board was
not impartial, as shown by the testimony of Murphy
quoted herein and the appointment of Fitzgerald
who had stated at the Tri-State Council that any
one supporting the resolutions for amendment of
the constitution would get in trouble. Also, throughout the trial the members of the trial board conferred constantly with Byron who had not only preferred the charges but also had appointed the trial
board. Thus, Schroeder testified that the members
of the tria l board me't with Byron, Attorney Mulholland and other officers when he first arrived in
Los Angeles for the trials and that they would meet
in Byron's room every evening after the trial hearings and go to dinner together ( N JT 3965-3970).
1

On June 8, 1954, the members of the trial board
1net the accused members in the lobby of the Statler
Hotel and offered to take Nichols to the trial room
to stand trial, if he would go alone ( N JT 3909).
The offer was not extended to either Nance or
Hanley (ibid) . The trial board then proceeded to
try Hanley and Nance in absentia ( Exh. 7 and Exh.
10). Although Han1ey had been notified to appear
for trial on June 9, 1954, he was actually tried on
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June 8, 1954. Nance had never been called for trial,
and although he was notified that his trial would
be on June 8th, he was tried in absentia on June 10,
1954 (Exh. 10).
THE UNION APPEALS AND EFFORTS FOR
REDRESS IN COURT

Thereafter, on June 29, 1954, the trial board
rendered decisions finding each of the plaintiffs
guilty of all of the charges which Byron had prefelTed against them. (Exh. 30, pp. 37, 53). From
these decisions plaintiffs appealed. Under the procedure prescribed by defendant's constitution, appeals from the decisions wou l'd ordinarily lie, first,
to the general president, secondly, to the general executive council, and thirdly, to defendant's general
convention (Exh. 53, Art. 19). Since Byron had
preferred the charges against the plain tiffs he disqualified himself from hearing their appeals, which
were referred to the general executive council (Exh.
26). In order that they might not lose their chance
to appeal to the general convention which was schedu1ed to be held in August, and because several
members of the general executive council had expressed themeselves as being biased and prejudiced
against 'the plaintiffs (NJT 386-388), plaintiffs
waived the right to have their appeals heard by the
general executive council (NJT 389). The appeals
were accordingly referred to the grievance and ap1
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peals committee. This committee, like all committees
of the general convention, was appointed by Byron
as general president. (Exh. 53~ Art. 7, Sec. 7). Hanley appeared before the committee representing not
only himself, but also Nance, who was unable to
attend the convention (NJT 1456). He endeavored
to introduce evidence refuting the charges preferred
against plaintiffs and showing that the decision of
the trial board was erroneous. The committee, however, refused to receive any new evidence and insisted that the appeals be heard on the record of the
trials held in absentia (NJT 403 et seq). Thereafter, the committee recon1mended to the convention that the decisions of the trial board be affirmed
and the appeals denied (Ex. 30, pp. 58-61). Although Hanley had been promised the opportunity
of addressing the convention in support of the appeals, this privilege was finally denied (NJT 412414). The recommendations of the committee were
accepted and adopted by the convention by a standing vote, seven delegates dissenting in the case of
Hanley's appeal (Exh. 30, pp. 63-66). It may be
noted that under the defendant's constitution, the
seven dissenting votes may have been sufficient to
call for a reversal since the delegate or delegates of
each local union were en ti tied to cast one vote for
each fifty members in the union electing them (Exh.
53, Art. 7, Sec. 2a).
30
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It was plain that the grievance and appeals
comn1ittee was not an unbiased tribunal. In this
connection Burk, the chairman of the committee,
told Hanley in the presence of several persons that
the "skids were greased", the committee having received orders to deny the appeals, and that there
was nothing the commi tee could do about it ( N JT
417-418, 1638, 1825). Moulder, another member
of the committee, made statements to the same effect ( NJT 442). There was much evidence to shovv
that delegates were intimidated and pressure was
exerted on them to affirm the expulsions, as shown
by the testimony of de'legate White (NJT 20732076). And this despite the fact that defendant's
general counsel stated that "they had nothing on
Hanley" ( NJT 392-394, 1822).
Following their expulsion, plaintiffs brought
mandamus proceedings in Nevada to compel defendant to reinstate them. Service of process up defendant was attempted to be made by serving the officers of several of the local unions in Nevada, but
on defendant's motion the service was quashed by
the trial court on the ground that the persons served
were not agents of the defendant. The action of
the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Nevada. See Hanley v. Sheet Metal Workers Int.
Assn., 293 P. 2d 544. Thereafter defendant seduously
kept all of its officers, international representatives
31
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and other agents from entering the State of Nevada
and plain tiffs were unable to effect service of process upon it. This proceeding was then brought in
Utah during 1957 and valid service of process upon
defendant was effected.
DAMAGES AFTER EXPULSION THE JURY TRIAL

The foregoing is a greatly condensed summary
of the evidence introduced on the issues tried by the
court sitting without a jury. Following the court's
decision that plaintiffs had been wrongfully expelled, the issues reserved by the court's order for
trial by jury came on to be heard, and the following
is a summary of the evidence adduced at this trial.
In the states of Arizona, California, Nevada
and Utah, the several 1ocal unions of defendant
operate what is known as a referral or clearance
system for employment. Under this system, contractors and other employers desiring to hire sheet
n1etal workers call the business agent of the local
union who then orally or in writing refers or
"clears" available men to them. Without such a
referral or Clearance it is as a practical matter
impossible for an unemployed sheet metal worker to obtain or retain employment. ( JT 28-30). Indeed, if a sheet metal worker obtained employment
from a union contractor or an employer without such
a referral or clearance the local business agent
1
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would likely call a strike against the offending
employer, or the other union emp1oyees would likely
walk out en masse. This is shown, in addition to other
evidence, by the recording of a conversation which
took place between W. J. Fields, the business agent
of defendant's Phoenix, Arizona local union, and
the plaintiff Nance in December, 1956 (JT 2642)
as transcribed in Exh. 188, as follows:
MR. NANCE: How's the work siluation, Bill?
MR. FIELDS: It has not been very good
down here now. It has been pretty fair. I've
got all the local boys back to work at the present time, anyway - at least for the next
few days, so far as I know.
MR. NANCE: Well, Es ten, I want to
stay around here for a while and look for a
job, and suppose I find my own job, win you
give me a clearance?
MR. FIELDS: No.
MR. NANCE: Why not? If I find my
own job, Bill?
MR. FIELDS: Find your own job in
one of our shops - in one of my shops?
MR. NANCE: Anywhere I can go to
work for you.
MR. FIELDS: Do you have a card?
MR. NANCE: No. You know I was expelled by the In tern a tional.
MR. FIELDS: Now you know we have
no business of clearing out anybody like that.
If you find an employer who will take you,
1
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why then he can go ahead and take you.
That's up to him.
MR. NANCE: Well, I'm out of a job and
I went out at one of the union shops, Bill,
and he said I could go to work if I could get
cleared with the union.
MR. FIELDS: Who told you a story like
that?
MR. NANCE: A fellow who worked at
the shop right behind the Southwest 'Manufacturing Company.
MR. FIELDS : Right behind the Southwest?
MR. NANCE: Southwest Manufacturing Company.
MR. FIELDS: You mean Frank Harmonsen, do you?
MR. NANCE: Yes, Frank Harmonsen's Shop.
MR. FIELDS: Oh. Who were you talking to?
MR. NANCE: I talked to the foreman,
a fellow by the name of Platt. What's his
name?
MR. FIELDS: Dick Platt?
MR. NANCE: Dick Platt.
MR. FIELDS: Oh! Well, those guys,
of course, they- Well, now, Howard Wall,
I talked to the foreman there this morning and
I got some guys coming in from Glendale.
That's how we get mixed up. Now, I talked
to him just this morning and I got some fellows getting laid off from Glendale here- it
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will be a couple or three days - and he is going to take them, now that's the way they get
all mixed up. Dick Platt has done that before.
These guys come in and he says, "Oh, yes,
I'll take you." That's his way of saying, "Well,
if you get straightened out with the union,
why that's all right.''
MR. NANCE: If I get a clearance out
of the union, if I have to have a clearance out
of your office, now if I find a job in a union
shop, will you give me a clearance if they'll
hire me?
MR. FIELDS : It depends here on how
my men situation is. If I got men available
here for 'em. Listen, these shops have no God
damn business, so far as I'm concerned, I
mean, I don't give a shit. I won't even furnish
them any men if they are going to pick their
men off the street. Why they can get them
that way. I'H take my men out of the shop.
They can get them off the street. Otherwise,
why they call my office for the men because
that's in the contract and we agreed to furnish the1n men. If we can't furnish them men,
we've got a certain specified time, then they
can get their men where they want to.
MR. NANCE: I don't see any reason
why you wouldn't clear me out if a union shop
will hire me. Personally, that's what I want
to know, if you will kindly give me a job. I've
got to know, Bill. I've got to have a job and
I've got a family to support.
MR. FIELDS: Well, it depends here,
Troy, on how my situation is. This is a slow
time here for us, you see, than normally is.
We are busier this winter than we have ever
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been, but it is a slow time of year. If we were
rushed and pushed for men and I had no men
being out of work and none of my members
out of work, we put our permit men out, you
see, we would put men out on permit, put
them out that way, but when I got my members out of work, I'm not putting any permit
men out, putting guys ou't like that. It has
been done before here. I mean, when the shop
goes ahead, why that's their own liability. If
they want to go ahead and do that, why they
can go ahead, because I'm not going to answer
for what the rest of the men in the shop are
going to do if they pick up and walk out or
what they do. If a man comes in without a
clearance or anything from me, why they
probably will. That's the way they do. But
if I got men out of work and if I can furnish
the men and if they are called up here from
me and ask me to get men, from me, and I
can furnish 'em, why then our own union
members, why then they have no business of
telling anybody. I've told them that before on
account of this right to work law.
MR. NANCE: Have you told 'them they
had to hire the men through the union hall?
MR. FIELDS: Why it's in the contract.
It's in their contract, brother, its written right
in there.
MR. NANCE: Okeh, Bill, I'll see you
later then.
MR. FIELDS: Y a!
Prior to the decision of the trial board, Byron
telephoned C. E. Vaughn, the business agent of
Local Union No. 88 in Las Vegas, Nevada, and told
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him that unless he kept Hanley and Nance fro1n
working he would be expelled. Vaughn asked him
the grounds on which he would be expelled, and
Byron replied: "Never mind. I have more power
than Stalin or Hitler ever had. The lawyers \vill
find the grounds" (JT 26-27). Byron also gave
similar instructions to Chas. Williams, acting business agent of Local Union No. 88 (JT 302-304).
Vaughn had previously been threatened by Leon
Reliford, one of defendant's international representatives, with expulsion if he permitted plaintiffs to
work. ( JT 24). Vaughn attended defendant's convention in Montreal, Canada in August, 1954, and
while there he was again told by Byron that he was
not to permit Nance or Han'ley to work ( JT 28-29).
When Vaughn returned from the convention,
Nance was employed by the Maslow Heating & Cooling Company in Las Vegas, Nevada ( JT 34) .
Vaughn immediately dispatched a le'tter to Maslow
calling attention to the fact that Nance had been
expelled and insisting that he be not permitted to
work (Exh. 147, JT 621-623). Copies of this letter
were posted in the shops of all employers in the Las
Vegas area (JT 37). Thereafter Vaughn refused to
issue referrals or work clearances to either Nance or
Hanley and they were unable to keep work (JT 30,
627, 632, 1029). In January, 1955, the members of
Local Union No. 88 voted 82 to 2 to accept Hanley's
37
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dues (Nance was last a member of Local Union No.
371) and to refer or clear both of the plaintiffs to
jobs. (JT 32). Vaughn issued referrals or work
clearances to both Nance and Hanley from that
ti1ne until August 16, 1955, when he was removed
as business agent for Byron for failure to carry
out Byron's orders regarding the plaintiffs (JT 32,
55, 39). During this time plaintiffs were working,
but upon Vaughn's removal both were discharged
from their employment (JT 1070, 1076-1077).
Walter Vickers succeeded Vaughn as business
agent of Local Union No. 88, and he was called to
Chicago and received instructions from Byron. ( JT
54, 2059-2060). Charles Biggert became business
agent after Vickers, and he was succeeded by Ernest
Newman (JT 54). None of these business agents
would issue work clearances to plaintiffs, and from
the time of Vaughn's removal to the time of trial
plaintiffs were unable to obtain work as sheet metal
\vorkers in the Las Vegas area where they resided
(JT 652, 656-657, 1151, 1210-1211). The record
contains a great deal of testimony by both of the
plaintiffs and other witnesses that the plaintiffs
made numerous applications for work but were refused employment because they were expelled members of the union.
In an attempt to show that plaintiffs suffered
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no damage as a result of their expulsion, defendant
offered the testimony of seve1·al contractors that
they refused to employ plaintiff because they were
personally disliked by them. Defendant also attempted to show that the referral or work clearance
was not in use, and apparently triad to prove that
a union card had no monetary value. Fields, the
business agent at Phoenix, testified that a work referral was not necessary in his area, but his testimony was completely discredited by the recording
of his own words to Nance previously quoted ( JT
2202-2203, 2222-2223). And it is very significant
that defendant did not call either Vickers or Biggert, the two men best able to testify to the referral
practices in Las Vegas during the long period when
plaintiffs were unable to obtain work. Also, the
testimony regarding Byron's instructions to Vaughn
and Williams not to permit the plaintiffs to work was
absolutely uncontradicted as Byron was also not
called as a witness, although he was certainly "available".
Nance was compelled to accept employment as
a service station attendant (JT 730-731), and Hanley was constrained to support himself and his fainily by selling his possessions and by borrowing funds
(JT 1292-1294). The average earnings of sheet
metal workers in the Las Vegas area during the
years 1954 to 1958 were approximately $9,000.00 a
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year (JT 566, 1236-1239). In contrast, Nance's
earnings after his expulsion were only as follows
(JT 732-735):
J u1y 1 to December 31, 1954 $1,938.67
1955
3,778.11
1956
506.86
1957
3,351.00
1958
2,653.12
Hanley's earnings after his expulsion were on1y
as follows ( JT 1233-1234) :
July 1 to December 31, 1954 $ 100.00
1955
4,634.30
1956
500.00
1957
600.00
1958
1,626.50
The defendant resorted to a strategy of delay
and confusion in the trial before the jury. What
'"~Yas said in the introduction regarding incessant
and repetitious objections and arguments of counsel was doubly true during the jury trial. By reference to any volume of the transcript it will be seen
that the constant objections, arguments and unnecesary proffers of testimony by defendant's counsel caused a veritable parade of the jury in and out
of the court room, and the court com men ted on this
situation ( JT 1963). Despite the uncontradicted
evidence and the natural and inevitable damage resulting from the loss of union membership, the jury
returned a verdict that plaintiffs had suffered no
actual damage whatsoever.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE WRONGFULLY EXPELLED FROM
MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANT UNION AND THAT
THEIR EXPULSIONS vVERE NULL AND VOID.
POINT IB
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDIKG
THAT PLAINTIFFS' REMEDIES ON APPEAL DID
NOT CURE THE DEFECTS OF THE TRIAL BOARD
PROCEEDINGS.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT AND ITS OFFICERS
WERE MALICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREFERRING
OF CHARGES, TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL
THROUGH THE UNION PROCEEDING.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING NOMINAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
POINT IV
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AND
THE POWER TO ENFORCE THE WRIT OF lVIANDATE, AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY FEES.
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN TAXING CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT.
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POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
In presenting our argument in this brief, we
shall first consider and answer the arguments advanced by defendant in support of its appeal, and
then present our argument in support of plaintiffs' cross appeal.
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE WRONGFULLY EXPELLED FROM
MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANT UNION AND THAT
THEIR EXPULSIONS WERE NULL AND VOID.

The defendant argues that plaintiffs were rightfully expelled by defendant after trials held in their
absence. It bases this argument on the contention
that plaintiffs deliberately refused to stand trial,
and to that end wilfully disrupted the proceedings
before the trial board on June 3, 4 and 7, 1954,
to such an extent that their trials could not get underway. The court below found against that contention. To overturn this finding, defendant points
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only to the transcript of the proceedings before the
trial board the days mentioned (Exhibits 4, 5 and
6, which it has printed as an appendix to its brief).
In so doing, defendant has chosen to disregard the
fact that the finding was based not only on that
transcript, but also on volumes of oral and documentary evidence in which everything that took
place before the trial board was fully canvassed and
explored. The findings of the court below are am ply
supported by this evidence, and defendant has failed
to show the contrary. Indeed, it cannot do so.
But even on the basis of the defendant's own
brief, and the transcript of the proceedings before
the trial board on which defendant relies, it is manifest that defendant's argument cannot be sustained.
An analysis of the transcript shows that plaintiffs
did no more than request ( 1) a continuance, ( 2)
a bill of particulars clarifying the charges preferred
against them, (3) the right to be confronted by
their accuser and ( 4) that they be tried in what
they considered to be the proper venue. All of these
requests were reasonable, were properly made at
the start of plaintiffs' trial, and under the provisions of defendant's own constitution should have
been gran ted.
Certainly there was nothing improper in plaintiffs' request for a continuance. Section 2 (j) of
Article 18 of defendant's constitution (which by
43
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Section 3 (c) of the same Article is made applic..
able to trials held before general officers) provides:
Either party shall be granted a postponment of the trial for a reasonable period of
time if valid reasons are pre sen ted to the trial
committee or the trial committee may postpone the trial on its own motion for not more
than thirty days.
Defendant by its own evidence claims that it had
employed lawyers and investigators and had spent
n1onths in assembling evidence for use in the preparation of the charges preferred against plaintiffs.
Yet Hanley saw a copy of the charges against him
only 10 days before he was ordered to stand trial,
v.Thile Nance received a copy of the charges against
hi1n only 16 days before he was scheduled to go on
trial. In these circumstances, plaintiffs' requests
for a continuance were plainly reasonable.
Nor were the requests for a bill of particulars
clarifying the charges unreasonable or in any way
in1proper. Section 1 (b) of Article 18 of the constitution provides that all charges shall:
( 3) contain a detailed statement of the facts
out of which such charges originated;
( 4) contain specific reference to Article, Section and Paragraph of the constitution,
the policies, decisions, laws, rules or regulations which it is alleged have been or
are being viola ted;
( 5) state the nature of the violations claimed.
The charges preferred against plaintiffs, particu44
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larly those preferred against Hanley, most certainly do not comply with the foregoing requirements,
for they do not contain a detailed statement of
facts nor in fact any statement of facts out of
which the charges originated. Typical of the charges
preferred against Hanley are the following:
1. Bringing the labor movement and
this association into disrepute in violation of
Section 17 (a) of Article Ten ( 10) and Section 1 (a) of Article Seventeen ( 17) of the
International Constitution by:
(c) Having knowledge of extortion and
attempted extortion on the part of certain
members of Local Union 108 and Local Union
88 and not reporting the same to the general
president and failing to take any steps to prevent its further occurrence.
2. Failing and refusing to cooperate
with and defying the duly constituted officers
of the Los Angeles Building Trades Council
and representatives of other bona fide labor
organizations while acting as International
Representative having supervision over Local
Union 371, to such extent that Sheet Metal
Workers International Association and its
affiliated local unions are completely discredited in the labor movement in the Los Angeles area, which conduct is in violation of
Section 17 (a) of Article 10 and Section 1 (a)
of Article 17 of the International Constitution.
Clearly, the foregoing charges (and they are typical
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of the others) fail to meet the requirements of the
constitution. Hanley's written demand for bill of
particulars ( Exh. 18) was, therefore, clearly proper, and he did right in pressing for it before the
trial board.
Likewise, there was nothing improper in Hanley's asking that the charges be prosecuted by the
person who preferred them, Robert Byron. Section
1 (c) of Article 17 of the constitution provides that
it shall be an expellable offense for one to fail to
appear as a prosecuting witness after filing charges
against an officer or member, or to present all facts
and evidence to support any charges so filed. Section 2 (h) of Article 18 provides, "Should those who
preferred the charges fail to appear after due notice, the charges shall be dismissed without prejudice." This provision is made applicable to trials
before general officers by Section 3 (c) of Article
18. The constitution provides in two places that
when a member is tried before general officers, he
shall be entitled to be represented by a good standing member as his counsel (Section 3 (b) and Section 4 of Article 18) , but no such right is accorded
to those preferring the charges.
Finally, Hanley cannot be criticized for asking
that his trial be held in Las Vegas, Nevada, the
city where his local union has its office. In this
connection, Section 3 (a) of Article 18 provides,
46
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"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the trial
shall be held at the point where the office of such
local union or council is located ... " True, defendant contends that this provision is inapplicable because the charges were not filed with the local union.
This contention is of doubtful validity. Section 3 (a)
of Article 18 provides further that, "If charges were
initially filed with the general president as provided
in Section 4 of this Article, he shall notify the accused and those preferring the charges in writing,
by registered mail, of the time and place of such
trial." The constitution makes provision for filing
charges only with a local union or with the general
president. Here the charges were not filed with the
general president but by him. A literal reading of
the constitution would seem to require that in such
case the charges be filed with a local union. The
plaintiffs' construction of the constitution is therefore at least as tenable as that urged by defendant.
In any case, we submit there was nothing censurable in Hanley's asking to be tried in the place of
his residence.
An examination of Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 discloses that Hanley at no time refused to stand trial.
On the contrary, he expressed emphatically and repeatedly a desire to stand trial ( Exh. 4, pp. 29-30,
48, 55-60, 100, 102-103, 112, Exh. 5, p. 117). At
page 117 of Exh. 5, quoted at page 14 of defendant's
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brief, he said, "I desire to continue my trial if the
General President would comply with the Constitution and filing of the charges properly," and in
the speech quoted at page 15 of defendant's brief
he again stated his desire for a proper trial by
saying, "I will submit my case, and I will defend
Nichols and Fuller before anybody, any impartial
Board. I will submit it to this union." As for Nance,
he took so little part in the proceedings before the
trial board that there is nothing from which it can
be even argued that he refused to stand trial.
On June 7 Hanley was notified that he was to
stand trial on June 9, and Nance was notified that
he would stand trial after the conclusion of the trial
of Fuller probably on June 8. ( Exh. 6, pp. 4 and 5).
It is undisputed that neither Nance nor Hanley
refused to stand trial on the dates they were thus
summoned to appear, unless their failure to accept
what defendant has termed the "last chance offer"
can be considered to be a refusal to stand trial. We
submit that it cannot, because for one reason the
offer was not extended either to Nance or to Hanley. The so called "last chance offer" was made on
the morning of June 8 when the trial board met the
accused in the lobby of the hotel. The circumstances
under which the alleged offer was made were explained by defendant's witness Schroeder as follows (NJT 3909):
48
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Q. All right. I want you to state what
happened from the time you went down in
the lobby. Describe to the court what you observed and what you heard and what you
said.
A. I'll have to make an explanation.
Mr. Nichols was unable to attend the Monday trial and he had not been notified that he
would be tried in absentia, I'm reasonably
sure.
Q. All right.
A. And our purpose was then to invite
1ll1·. Nichols to, or rather to ascertain as to
zchether he was agreeable to standing trial,
or zchat his intentions were.
Q. All right. Now state what happened.
A. (continuing) With respect to the
trial, we'll say.
Q. All right, State what happened, then,
when you went down in the elevator.
A. Mr. Rosen was there at that time.
Asked Mr. Nichols if he was ready to stand
trial in an orderly way.
Q. All right.
A. Under the rules of procedure. And
he indicated that - he said, yes he would.
And he wanted to know where the trial would
be.
Q. Is this Mr. Nichols talking now, Mr.
Schroeder?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.
A. And Mr. Rosen said, "Well, if you'll
49
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- we'll not tell you that, we will take you
to the trial room, then you will be privileged
to call your witnesses and so forth."
Q. All right.
A. But he was not given the number of
the room where the trial would be, where
the trial board would convene, for the purpose of the trial.
Q. All right. Now what, if anything was
said to Mr. Hanley or any of the others and
what if anything was said by Mr. Hanley or
any of the others?
A. Well, now you are speaking of J1r.
Hanley. I can't recall. But Mr. Nichols at
that point - changing it to Mr. Nichols wanted to know the room number. And then
Mr. Hanley, I'm sure chimed in and also
wanted to know where the trial would be
held. He wanted to know where the trial
would be held.
That this so called "last chance offer" was extended only to Nichols and not to either of the plaintiffs is further shown by the following quotation
which appears in the self-serving decision of the
Trial Board finding both plaintiffs guilty of the
charges preferred against them ( Exh. 24 and 48) :
The defendant C. A. Nichols had again
been excused to attend court on June 7th and
was not present when the Board ruled that
the defendants would be tried in absentia,
consequently the Board advised him to be present for trial on Tuesday June 8th. In order
to forestall the overwhelming of the trial room
50
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by the accused and their cohorts, the members of the Trial Board met Brother Nichols
in the lobby of the Statler Hotel at 10:00
A.lVL on the morning of June 8th. Brother
Nichols arrived, accompanied by Brothers
Hanley, Nance and Fuller and about fifteen
othe1· persons, the later group increasing in
size until about thirty or forty persons were
present. The chairman of the Trial Board told
Brother Nichols that the Board was ready to
proceed with his trial if he and his counsel
would come to the trial room unaccompanied
by the other defendants and the rest of the
group which was demanding admission.
It is submitted that defendant cannot show
any refusal to stand trial on the part of either of
the plain tiffs on the basis of the so-called "last
chance offer", which as shown above was made
only to Nichols. And even if it were extended to
plaintiffs, there is no showing that they refused
a proper trial.
Defendant's attempts to justify plaintiffs' being
tried in their absence on the ground that the spectators present on the days of the open hearings, i.e.,
on June 3, 4 and 7, failed to obey the repeated demands of the chairman of the Trial Board that the
trial room be cleared of all "witnesses" and that the
presence of such spectators and their conduct created such confusion and disorder that it was impossible for the trials to proceed. The short answer
to this contention is that plaintiffs were not re51
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sponsible for the presence of the spectators and were
not responsible for their failure to comply with the
requests to leave. Hanley repeatedly told the Trial
Board this ( Exh. 4, pp. 31, 61, 63-64; Exh. 5, pp.
115, 118).
Quite apart from the foregoing, the evidence
is uncontradicted that defendant made all arrangements for holding the trials of the plaintiffs; that
it rented the room in which the trials were to be
held; that police officers were present at all times;
and that there was no disturbance of the peace or
disorderly conduct on the part of any persons present. If the presence or conduct of any persons
present were such as to prevent an orderly trial, it
would have been a simple matter for the Trial
Board to request the police officers present to eject
the offending parties. The responsibility for conducting orderly trials rested on the defendant and
on the defendant alone. In these circumstances, the
following finding of the court below, as set forth
in its Memorandum of Decision filed December 30 1
1959, (R. 349) cannot successfully be challenged:
7. That neither the petitioner nor the
intervenor nor any person authorized to speak
or act for them or either of them conducted
himself in such a way as to justify the trial
committee in trying them or either of them in
absentia. That the evidence presented as to
the conduct of the petitioner and intervenor
and other persons at open hearings conducted
52
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by the trial committee on June 3, 4 and 7,
1954, does not show any violence or threat of
violence or any disturbance of the peace at
said sessions of the trial committee. That
police officers were present in the hearing
room and the court believes that they were
ready and able to prevent any violence or disturbance of the peace. That protests and objections made by petitioner and intervenor at
said open hearings were not so lacking in
merit as to constitute or be construed as a
refusal to stand trial or as a waiver of trial,
or to justify the Trial Board in ordering them
or either of them to be tried in absentia.
It follows, therefore, that since neither of the
plaintiffs refused either by words or by conduct,
to stand trial, their expulsion was wrongful. For
no principle of law is better established than that
no 1nember of a labor organization can be expelled
except after a trial meeting the minimum requirenlents of due process, including notice of the time
and place of trial, the opportunity to be confronted
by and to cross examine the witnesses called against
hin1, and to call witnesses and to adduce evidence
in his defense. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Asso.,
37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P. 2d 6, 21 ALR 2d 1387;
1llahoney v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, 43 Wash.
2d 874, 264 P. 2d 1095; Ellis v. American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal. App. 2d 440, 443-444, 120
P. 2d 79; Annotation, 21 ALR 2d 1397.
Indeed, the requirements of proceedural due
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process are now written into the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Section
101 (a) (5) of which provides as follows:
No member of any labor organization may be
fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined, except for non-payment of dues, by
such organization or any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with
written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded
a full and fair hearing.
Since neither of the plaintiffs were accorded the
benefits of the minimum requirements of due process, their expulsion was manifestly wrongful and
null and void.
We have no quarrel with the cases cited and
relied upon by defendant, but they are clearly not
in point. In Smith v. Kern County Medical Association, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P. 2d 87 4, in Davis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 141 P. 2d 486, in Miller v. I. A.
of Operrating Engineers, 118 Cal. App. 2d 66, 257
P. 2d 85, and in Werner v. Int. Assn. of Machinists,
11 Ill. App. 2d 258, 137 NE 2d 100, the expelled
member failed to appear at the time set for his trial.
No such situation confronts us here, for each of the
plaintiffs appeared and insisted upon the right to
make his defense. As for the case of Allen v. Los
Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 51
Cal. 2d 80'5, 387 P. 2d 457, which defendant cites
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in support of its contention that plaintiffs should
be barred from relief because they did not come
into court with clean hands, it is clearly not in point.
The clean hands doctrine or rule is a rule which
pern1i ts a court in its discretion to withhold an
equitable remedy where the party seeking the remedy
does not come into court with clean hands. But the
discretion to grant or withhold the remedy is vested
in the trier of the fact, that is to say, in the trial
court. In the Allen case, the trial court exercised
its discretion in favor of the defendant, whereas in
the present case the trial court exercised its discretion in favor of the plaintiffs. But in any case, there
is no basis for saying that either Nance or Hanley
did not come into court with clean hands. Defendant
bases its contention to the contrary on plaintiff's
alleged misconduct before the Trial Board, but as
we have shown, their conduct was neither improper
nor censurable in the circumstances.
POINT IB
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS' REMEDIES ON APPEAL DID
NOT CURE THE DEFECTS OF THE TRIAL BOARD
PROCEEDINGS.

The defendant next asserts that regardless of
any defects in the proceedings before the Trial
Board, plaintiffs are in no position to complain because they had the opportunity to incorporate with
the appeals which they took documentary evidence
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refuting the charges of which they were found
guilty. In other words, defendant contends that
even if plaintiffs were exepelled without having
charges preferred against them or given any opportunity whatsoever to defend themselves, they are
now barred from challenging their expulsion because of their failure to attach to their appeal
papers documentary evidence refuting the charges
on the basis of which they were expelled. The mere
statement of this contention is sufficient to show
its fallacy.
Not only the constitution (Art. 18, Sec. 3(b)
and Sec. 2 (c) ) , but the general law guaranteed to
plaintiffs the right to be confronted by and to cross
examine the witnesses called against them, and to
call witnesses in their defense. As said in Cason v.
Glass Bottle Blowers Association, supra:
The union's procedure, however, must be such
as will afford the accused member substantial
justice, and the requirements of a fair trial
will be imposed even though the rules of the
union fail to provide therefor. (Citations
omitted). The authorities recognize that such
a trial includes the right to notice of charges,
to confront and cross examine the accusers,
and to examine and refute the evidence.
See also Werner v. Int. Ass'n. of Machinists,
supra, at page 112 of 137 NE 2d.
This right to cross examine the witnesses called
against them and to call witnesses in their defense
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was denied to plaintiffs. The deprivation of that
right could not be cured by giving plaintiffs the
chance to present documentary evidence. As a matter of fact, plaintiffs endeavored to call witnesses
and to introduce documentary evidence before the
gTievance and appeals committee, but the committee
refused to permit them to do so.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT AND ITS OFFICERS
WERE MALICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREFERRING
OF CHARGES, TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL
THROUGH THE UNION PROCEEDING.

The second point urged by defendant on its
appeal is that the court below erred in holding that
in preferring charges against plaintiffs, in the conduct of the trial proceedings, as well as in the conduct of the appeal proceedings, the defendant and its
officers acted maliciously toward the plain tiffs. Befol·e proceeding to answer the argument urged by
defendant in support of this point, we are constrained to correct some misconceptions upon which
the argument is seemingly based.
In the first place, the question of malice went
not only to plaintiffs' right to recover exemplary
dan1ages, as defendant seemingly contends, but also
to the validity of plaintiff's expulsion. This is shown
not only by Nance's original petition for a writ of
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mandamus, his reply to defendant's counterclaim,
and Hanley's complaint in intervention, but also by
the trial judge's Memorandum of Decision ( Appendix, pp. 1 to 10) and to its Second Supplemental
lVIemorandum of Decision (Appendix, pp. 19 to 34).
It is true that in rendering his original decision the
trial judge postponed his decision as to malice pending trial before a jury of the issues whether plaintiffs had sustained any actual damages as a result
of their expulsion and whether as a consequence of
acts committed by defendant subsequent to their
expulsion they were entitled to exemplary damages
He did so, however, only ( 1) because he did not
wish to influence the jury in its consideration of
the issue whether after plaintiffs' expulsion defendant had acted with malice toward the plaintiffs,
and (2) he wished to have the benefit of evidence
as to defendant's conduct after plaintiff's expulsion
insofar as it might throw light on the issue whether
in expelling plaintiffs defendant acted wilfully and
maliciously toward them. The question of malice,
therefore, went not only to the question whether
plaintiffs were entitled to exemplary damages, but
also to the legality of their expulsion. That plaintiffs' expulsion was invalid if the whole proceedings taken against them were so far permeated
with, and the result of malice, as to amount to a
sham or farce is too clear, we submit, to require argu58
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ment. See for example, Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App.
Di,·. 2cl 521, 184 NYS 2d 226, where the expulsion
of "a dissident group whom the entrenched officers
of the local union, working with or without the aid
of the Brotherhood representative, were apparently
seeking to suppress" was set aside. See also, Grand
Int'l. Bro. of Locomotive Engrs. v. Green, 210 Ala.
496, 98 So. 596.
In the second place, the reports which Byron
received from Fulmor and Ely, and upon which
defendant maintains Byron acted in preferring
charges against plaintiffs, did not implicate either
Hanley or Nance "in a murder, in shake down actiYities against contractors, etc." as claimed by defendant at page 47 of its brief. In this connection,
defendant's general vice president Cronin described
the complaints made by Fulmor and Ely as follows
(NJT 3360):
Well, Mr. Ely, of course, acted as the spokesman for the two and he stated that he came
to Chicago to meet a representative of the
International Union, who were meeting with
the contractors at the time to complain of
certain situations that existed with regard
to 108 on the coast. He complained that the
apprenticeship committee was not functioning properly, he complained with regard to
the working of the Health and Welfare funds
and he said they were not satisfied with the
working of the vacation plan and that especially they were concerned with regard to
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work stoppages and jurisdictional disputes
in the Los Angeles area. That was the gist of
their complaint and that's what they said.
As for the so called Stetter reports, they were never
introduced in evidence. What they contained is therefore not before the court, except as shown by cross
examination, the defendant having successfully prevented their introduction in evidence.
Having thus corrected some obvious inaccuracies in defendant's statement, we may proceed to
answer defendant's argument. Defendant calls attention to the fact that the court found that Byron
had received reports which if believed would have
justified him in preferring charges against plaintiffs. It concedes, however, that the court also found,
that in preferring charges against and in expelling
plaintiffs, defendant and its officers acted wilfully
and maliciously. Defendant then contends that since
"at most, the evidence adduced in this issue of good
faith in the preferring of the charges gave rise to
two conflicting inferences ... it was error for the
court to draw the inference of bad faith". In support of this contention defendant cites the case of
N.L.R.B. v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 5 Cir.,
223 F. 2d 748. This decision, however, does not correctly state the law and was expressly repudiated
by the court which rendered it in N.L.R.B. v. Fox
Manufacturing Co., 5 Cir., 238 F. 2d 211, in which
the court at pages 214-215 said:
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Under the rule announced in Coats & Clark it
is still our duty to ascertain whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole
to make the inferences of legal and illegal discharge reasonably equal. But now if the ?'ecord '/,Carrants the conclusion that they are
reasonably equal, we may not overturn the
Board's findings of an illegal discharge.
Nor does Schofield v. Z.C.M.l., 85 Utah 281, 39
P. 2cl 342, 345, support defendant's contention. In
that case the court said merely :
A construction giving an instrument a legal
effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it can be reasonably be adopted, and
between possible constructions, that will be
adopted which establishes a valid contract.
Needless to say we are not here dealing with the
construction of a contract, but with the question
whether the defendant in expelling plaintiffs acted
maliciously. The court below found on conflicting
evidence that defendant so acted and its finding
cannot be disturbed. If there were two conflicting
inferences that might be drawn, it was for the trial
court to select the one that should be drawn. It
found that defendant acted wilfully and maliciously
and its finding, we submit, cannot successfully be
challenged.
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING NOMINAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

In our argument under this point we will cover
the questions raised by Points III, IV and V of defendant's brief.
Defendant's argument that the court below
erred in awarding nominal and punitive damages
disregards the stipulation and circumstances under
which this case was tried. For a recital of this stipulation and circumstances we refer this court to the
Order as to the Issues to be Submitted to the Jury
printed at pages 13 to 17 of the appendix to this
brief, and the facts leading up to the order recited
in the statement of facts at pages 3 to 5.
The issue of malice in procuring plaintiff's expulsion was thus reserved for decision of the judge
alone. As the trier of that issue of fact he was fully
authorized to award punitive damages to the plaintiffs if he resolved the issues in their favor and if
the other conditions necessary to sustain such an
award were present, for an award of punitive damages may be made by the judge where the factual
issues are tried by him. Calvat v. Franklin, 90 Colo.
444, 9 P. 2d 1061; Pure Oil Co. v. Quarles, 183 Okl.
418, 82 P. 2d 970; Pickwick Stages v. Boa'td of
Trustees of the City of El Paso De Robles, 54 Cal.
App. 730, 215 P. 558.
Here the trial judge resolved the issue of malice
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and bad faith in favor of plaintiffs and also found
that plaintiffs had suffered actual damages (See
paragraph 20 of the Second Supplemental Decision
on page 28 of the appendix to this brief). He was
therefore authorized to award nominal damages and
on the basis thereof to award punitive damages,
for by the great weight of authority an award of
nmninal damages, where actual damages have been
suffered, will support an award of punitive damages. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d
393, 221 P. 2d 965; Reynolds v. Pegler, 2 Cir., 223
F. 2d 429; Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211
P. 2d 420, 17 ALR 2d 518.
It is true that the jury found that plaintiffs
had not suffered actual damages, but the judge
after consideration of all the evidence held that this
finding was not supported by the evidence, saying:
Mter due consideration of the evidence presented before the jury and the answers of the
jury to Special Interrogatories, the court believes that the answers of the jury to Special
Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 (as to loss
of earnings and humiliation and mental suffering) are in each case opposed to the weight
of the evidence and that in each case the answer should have been "yes", also that the
jury should have awarded actual damages
to the petitioner and intervenor. The court
believes from the evidence that both the petitioner and intervenor suffered substantial loss
of income by reason of having been expelled
63
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from the union and also suffered embarrassment and humiliation by reason of such expulsion and being deprived of privileges and
benefits of union membership. (Appendix,
p. 28).
In these circurastances, the judge was entitled to
disregard the verdict of the jury and award nominal damages. Indeed, it would have been reversible
error for the court to have failed to award nominal
damages, not only for the reason that the evidence
showed beyond question that plaintiffs had suffered actual damages but also for the reason that
a right of the plaintiffs had been invaded which required vindication. Nasner v. Burton, 2 U. 2d 236,
272 P. 2d 163; Harmony Ditch Co. v. Sweeny, 31
Wyo. 1, 222 P. 577.
We turn then to arguments advanced by defendant in support of its contention that the award
of punitive damages should not be allowed to stand.
SUB-SECTION A

Defendant first argues that since this is a suit
to obtain relief formerly obtainable by a Writ of
Mandamus as well as equitable relief, the award
should be set aside because punitive damages are
not generally allowed in suits in equity. This is a
most technical argument. Plaintiffs could have
brought a separate action at law in which they undoubtedly could have recovered punitive damages. See
Grand Int'l. Bro. of Locomotive Engineers vs. Green,
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supra. They could have brought an independent
proceeding to have their expulsions set aside. The
n1ere fact that they sought both types of relief in
the same action should not deprive them of this
substantial right.
In any case, this is not a suit in equity but one
at law. Writs of Mandamus have been abolished
in this state (Rule 65B, U. R.C.P.). But the relief
forn1erly obtainable by a writ of mandamus can now
be obtained by a civil action (ibid.). In determining,
however, whether such an action is legal or equitable in nature the principles applicable before the
abolition of the writ are still applicable. A writ of
n1andamus was never an equitable remedy. Historically, it never issued out of the court of chancery but only out of the Court of Kings' Bench. See
2 Jones' Blackstone's Commentaries, p. 1633. As
early as 1860 the Supreme Court of the United
States said that a proceeding to obtain the writ had
become an ordinary action at law. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 100, 11 L. Ed. 513. So if we are to
resort to technicalities it is clear that this is not a
suit in equity but an action at law, and the principle
on which defendant relies is technically inapplicable.
Furthermore, in a proceeding such as this damages resembling exemplary damages, such as damages for mental suffering, humiliation, etc., are
clearly recoverable. See Nissen v. International
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Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 NW 858, 141
ALR 598. In any case, the rule that exemplary
damages are not recoverable in equity is not of
universal application. There are many cases holding that such damages can be recovered in equity.
See e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Benatar, supra.;
Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 20 Cal. App.
2d 170, 66 P. 2d 1215; Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 225, 194 P. 2d 553.
S DB-SECTION B

Defendant next contends that since the present
proceeding sounds in con tract and not in tort, and
since exemplary damages are not generally allowed
in actions for breach of contract, the award of
punitive damages should be set aside. It is true
that the basic right which plaintiffs seek to enforce
is contractual in nature. See !.A.M. v. Gonzales, 356
U.S. 617, 618, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1018, 78 S. Ct. 923.
But it is also true that the measure of damages in
an action such as this is that applicable in actions
sounding in tort. Cluxfee, The Internal Affairs of
Associations Not For Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993,
1003. As said by Professor Chafee in the article
last cited, "He (the expelled member) does not
merely recover for the loss of expected benefits, but
also recovers for injury to his reputation, just as
in defamation, and may receive punitive damages."
He is also entitled to recover "such sums as will
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compensate him for mental suffering and humiliation caused" by his expulsion. Nissen v. International Brotherhood, supra; Gonzales v. !.A.M., 142
Cal. App. 2d 202, 298 P. 2d 92, affirmed 356 U.S.
611, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1018, 78 S. Ct. 923. In this respect,
the present action is not like an action for breach
of an ordinary commercial contract, but resembles
more an action for breach of a contract to marry,
or an action for a tortious breach of a contract of
carriage resulting in injury to a passenger, in both
of which types of actions exemplary damages are
recoverable. 11 C.J.S. 813, Breach of Marriage Promise, Sec. 45; Forrester v. Southern Pacific Co., 36
Nev. 247, 134 P. 753. It is clear, we submit, that
plaintiffs were entitled to recover exemplary damages. Grand International Bro. of Locomotives Enginee1·s v. Green, supra.
SUB-SECTION C

Defendant argues, thirdly, that the court should
haYe left to the jury the question whether plaintiffs
were en ti tied to recover exemplary damages because of the acts of defendants and its officers in
procuring plaintiffs' expulsion. As shown by its
Order as to the Issues to be Submitted to the Jury
(Appendix, pp. 13-17) the court did submit to
the jury the question whether plaintiffs were entitled to exemplary damages because of acts committed after plaintiffs' expulsion but reserved to
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itself the question whether in procuring plaintiffs'
expulsion defendant and its officers acted maliciously, and whether on account thereof plaintiffs
were entitled to recover punitive damages. This was
done pursuant to a stipulation of the parties that
the issue whether plaintiffs were wrongfully expelled
should be determined by the court. That included
the issue, as we have shown, whether in effecting
plaintiffs' expulsion defendant acted in good faith
or with malice. Since the court was to determine
this factual issue, it was for the court and not the
jury to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled
to punitive damages on account of defendant bringing about plaintiffs' expulsion. Calvat v. Franklin,
supra, Pure Oil Co. v. Quarles, supra; Pickwick
Stages vs. Board of Trustees, etc., supra. If it were
otherwise, all of the evidence introduced before the
court in 10 weeks of trial would have had to be reintroduced before the jury - an unthinkable procedure.
SUB-SECTION D

The fourth argument advanced by defendant
for disallowing punitive damages is that since defendant is not a legal entity, all of its funds are
the joint property or assets of all of its members;
that to a ward punitive damages is to assess them
indirectly against the whole membership; and that
accordingly the malice or bad faith of defendant's
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officers should not be imputed to the defendant.
In support of this argument defendant cites La1vlor
1'. Loewe, 2 Cir., 187 F. 522 (the famous Danbury
Hatter's Case) ; s~veetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass.
:i-±9, 161 NE 272, 62 ALR 311; Schneider v. Local
60, 116 La. 270, 5 LRA (NS) 891; and Martin v.
Curran, 303 NY 276, 101 NE 2d 683. None of these
cases are in point. None of these cases involved the
question whether a labor union could be held liable
for exemplary damages. The first three involved
attempts to impose personal liability on individual
1nen1bers. Obviously they are not in point because
no such attempt is being made here. Any judgment
rendered in this action will be recoverable only from
the common funds of the union, and no part of it
can be enforced against the property or assets of
the individual members. Rule 17 (d), U.R.C.P. In
J.lllartin v. Curran, supra, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a labor union could not be held
liable for damages for libel unless the pleadings and
proof showed that all of the members had authorized or ratified the publication of the libel. But in
the later case of Madden v. Atkins, 4 NY 2d 283,
151 NE 2d 73, which defendant does not cite, the
same court held that the principle or rule is inapplicable in the case of actions for wrongful expulsion from membership. In that case the court said:
The Appellate Division was of the view, how69
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ever, that the precedents forbade an action
against a union for damages unless proof established an authorization or ratification of
the expulsion by all of the members and thereby rendered each and every one of them responsible for the wrong committed. While we
have held that to be the law where damages
are sought against an unincorporated association on account of libel (see Martin v.
Curran, 303 NY 276, 101 NE 2d 683) the
rule is otherwise in case of wrongful expulsion.
The cases relied upon by defendant do not,
therefore, support its argument. That its argument
cannot be sustained is further established by the
fact that labor unions can be and have been held
liable for punitive damages in cases such as this.
Moreover, the acts of defendant's officers in expelling plaintiffs were ratified by defendant's grievance and appeals committee and general convention.
This was enough to render defendant liable for their
acts.
SUB-SECTION E

Defendant next argues that it was error for
the court to award punitive damages after the jury
had found that plaintiffs had suffered no actual
damages. We have already answered this argument,
but we deem it prudent again to call the courts attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Montana in Fauver v. W ilkoske, supra. There the
jury found that the plaintiffs had suffered no ac70
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tual damage but awarded exemplary damages. The
Supreme Court upheld the award since it appeared
that the plaintiff must in fact have suffered actual
damages. In so doing it reversed several of its prior
decisions in favor of what it deemed to be the better
rule. See also, Sterling Drug Inc., v. Benatar, supra,
and Calvat v. Franklin, supra.
SUB-SECTION F

Defendant further agrues that "the award of
punitive damages in this case is erroneous as a
matter of law because in Utah ... punitive damages are not allowed unless compensatory damages
based on the tortius or illegal conduct are recovered"
(italics added). In support of this argument defendant cites and relies upon Graham v. Street, 2
Utah 2d 144, 270 P. 2d 456. But it is plain, however, that this case does not support the argument.
There the trial court had made an award of compensatory damages in the sum of $5,000 on the
basis of "highly speculative matters - distress,
anxiety and the effect on profits if Graham's experience and contacts had been utilized - which
according to defendant's contention, not denied by
plaintiffs, were unsupported by proof upon which
the court could base an intelligent decree". In other
words, the plaintiff failed to show that he had suffered any actual damages, and having failed to show
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actual damages, the a ward of punitive damages
necessarily fell.
As we have shown above, if a plaintiff proves
that he has in fact suffered actual damages, an
a ward of punitive damages may be made even
though no compensatory damages are recovered.
This is confirmed by the recent decision of this
court in Os_~ertag v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339
P. 2d 1022, wherein Chief Justice Crockett said:
It is undisputed that it was necessary for
the (plaintiff) to expend $140 for doctor and
dental bills incident to his injuries. The jury
awarded him only this sum but nothing for
the pain and suffering, loss of earnings, or
for humiliation and injury to his feelings, all
of which may properly be considered in awarding damages for such an assault. It is obvious that an award of some further compensatory damages would have been justified.
The fact that the verdict gave him nothing
but his actual expenditures, does not mean
that that is all the damage he suffered, nor
is it any reason for depriving him of the $860
award of punitive damages. That award could
be set aside if it 1vere clearly excessive in
view of the evidence as a whole and in comparison to the damages actually sustained.
We do not think the award as adjusted by the
trial court can be properly so characterized.
SUB-SECTION G

Under this heading defendant advances two
arguments. First, it reiterates its argument that
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the award of punitive damages must be set aside
because the amount thereof is disproportionate to
actual or nominal damages recovered. As we have
sho\\·n, this argument is untenable. The amount of
punitive damages awarded must bear some reasonable relationship to the amount of actual damages
suffel'ed or sustained, but it need not bear any relationship to the actual damages awarded. The rule
requiring a reasonable relationship between punitive damages and actual damages sustained, the
reason for applying it, and the weight to be given
to it were explained by this court in Ostertag v.
Lamont, supra, as follows:
As with damages for injuries generally there
is no method for exact calculation as to punitive damages, nor is there any precise formula for the relationship of punitive damages
to actual damages. The jury from its advantaged position must necessarily be allowed a
broad discretion in such matters. It is true
that this court has stated a number of times
that punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship to actual damages. This
is so because they must not be so disproportionate as to manifest that they were awarded
as a result of passion or prejudice, or under
misconception of, or in disregard of the law
or the evidence. But the relationship of punitive damages to actual damages awarded is
only one of the facts to be considered in determining whether the amount awarded should
be sustained. In appraising the punitive damages to see whether they are so excessive as
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to require a nullification of the verdict or
correction as a matter of law, it is necessary
to survey all of the circumstances as disclosed
by the evidence.

Here it is impossible to say that in assessing
punitive damages the trial judge was guilty of passion or prejudice or was laboring under a misconception or in disregard of the law or the evidence.
The damages suffered by plaintiffs were great and
extensive. Their loss of earnings alone exceeded
the amount of punitive damages awarded. In addition, they suffered humiliation by being branded as
expelled members. They were deprived of all of the
benefits and privileges of union membership. It is
idle for defendant to argue that these were without value. It is indeed something of a paradox for
a labor organization of the magnitude of the defendant to urge such an argument while continuing
to accept dues and assesments from its members
and urging workmen to join it. Not only were the
damages naturally flowing from plaintiffs' expulsion great, but not content with expelling plaintiffs, defendant as shown by the uncontradicted
evidence took affirmative action to see that these
damages were increased by instructing the business
agents of it local unions to make certain that plaintiffs did not work. In view of all of the facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, it is plain
that the punitive damages are not so excessive as to
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n·quire a nullification or correction of the award
thereof. Compare Reynolds v. Pegler, supra, where
an award of $1.00 actual damages and $100,000
punitive damages was upheld.
Secondly, the defendant argues that the trial
court considered improper factors. There is plainly
no 1nerit in this contention. Certainly there is nothing improper in considering the fact "trial in absentia, where there has been no consent or waiver,
is abhorrent to the principles of justice and fair
play". Even the Codes of Ethical Practices of the
AFL-CIO recognize this to be a fact, in providing
that in union disciplinary proceedings, "the essential requirements of due process - notice, hearing
and judgment on the evidence - should be observed". Nor was there anything improper in the
court's taking into consideration the fact that" the
wealth and power of an international labor union
was arrayed against individual union members with
n1eager resources". See Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d
362, 267 P. 2d 759. Likewise, it was not improper
for the court to consider the fact that the grievance
and appeals committee of defendant's general conYention had full knowledge of the injustice inflicted
upon plaintiffs and failed to take any action to correct it; or the fact that for four long years plaintiffs had been known and referred to as expelled
members and deprived of the benefits and privileges
75
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of union membership; or the fact that defendant
deliberately prolonged the trial of this action by
two intermediate appeals, constant and repeated
frivolous objections and other dilatory tactics to
the detriment of plaintiffs and to the great expense
of the taxpayers. In this connection there is nothing in the record to substantiate defendant's charge
that the punitive damages were awarded "in part
on account of the fact that the union had the temerity to defend this case in the first place and because the trial below cost the county and its tax~
payers some money". And the court below most
certainly did not penalize appellant union for defending itself instead of confessing judgment. It
did, however, and quite properly we think, take into
account the manner in which it conducted its defense.
POINT IV
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AND
'DHE POWER TO ENFORCE THE WRIT OF MANDATE, AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED.

Defendant next urges two contentions. First,
that the court was without jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus because if one were issued it
would be powerless to enforce it, since none of defendant's officers reside in Utah so as to be amenable to process of the courts of this state; and secondly, that the court erred in overruling defendant's
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motion to quash the service of process upon it. Both
of these contentions were urged on defendant's
first application for an intermediate appeal, and
the application was denied. (Case No. '8673).
Neither contention can be sustained. The first,
that the writ should be denied because the court
would be without power to enforce it since defendant's officers are non-residents of this state, is
plainly untenable. If it were sound there would not be
a court in the United States that would have jurisdiction to compel defendant to reinstate plaintiffs. Defendant's principal officers to not reside in the same
jurisdiction. Their residences are scattered throughout n1any states. There is not a court in the nation
that could acquire jurisdiction of a sufficient number of them to compel them, by physical restraint,
to obey a command to reinstate plaintiffs. In any
case, defendant's argument is based on a false and
untenable premise. The court below has both jurisdiction and power to compel defendant to obey its
conunand. Section 78-35-10, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
When a peremptory writ of mandate or writ
of prohibition has been issued and directed to
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, if it appears to the court that any
member of such tribunal, corporation, board,
or person upon whom such writ has been personally served, has without just excuse, refused or neglected to obey the same, the court
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may upon motion, impose a fine not exceeding
$500. In cases of persistence in refusal, the
court may order the party imprisoned until
the writ is obeyed, and may make any orders
necessary and proper for the complete enforcement of the writ.
Section 78-32-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
The following acts or omissions in respect to
a court or proceeding therein are contempts
of the authority of the court . . .
5. Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court.
It is thus apparent that disobedience of the
command to reinstant the plaintiffs could be enforced by process of contempt. It is today well settled that a labor union or other unincorporated
association, as such and as distinguished from its
officers and agents, may be adjudged guilty of contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330
U.S. 258, 91 L. Ed. 884, 67 S. Ct. 677; Oil Workers
Int'l Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512,
230 P. 2d 71, 104-106. Upon being adjudged guilty
of contempt, such an association can be compelled
to obey the court's command by the levy of a coercive fine. For example, in the United Mine Workers
case, supra, the court had issued an injunction restraining the defendant from continuing a strike.
The strike was already in progress when the injunction was issued, so that the injunction was in
effect a mandatory injunction. The union failed
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to call off the strike and the defendant and its
president, John L. Lewis, were cited for contempt.
The court adjudged both in contempt, and imposed
fixed fines on both the union and its president, and
in addition thereto a coercive fine upon the union
of $100,000 a day for each day the strike continued
in violation of the injunction. The Supreme Court
of the United States, although reducing the fixed
fine assessed against the union, affirmed the trial
court's order insofar as it imposed the coercive
fine. Needless to say, the strike was called off and
the injunction promptly obeyed.
The court's command to reinstate the plaintiffs
in this case can be enforced by similar process,
particularly in view of the fact that the defendant
has assets consisting of dues and per capita taxes
which are constantly accruing to it from its local
union and members in Utah, that can be reached
by the process of the courts of this state. The argulnent that the court would be powerless to enforce
a writ of mandate compelling defendant to reinstate the plaintiffs to membership is therefore without n1erit.
The defendant relies upon Pratt v. Amalgamated Ass'n. of Street & Electric Rwy. Employees,
50 Utah 472, 167 P. 830. In that case, the plaintiff
sought a writ of mandate to compel the defendant
to permit plaintiff to transfer from one local union
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to another. This court approved a judgment denying
him relief on the ground that he was not entitled
thereto on the merits. As an alternative ground of
decision, this court held that the writ should be
denied because the court would be powerless to enforce it, since only one of the defendant's officers
resided within this state, and he alone could not
effect compliance with the writ. This latter holding
is but an application of the principle that a writ
of mandamus will not issue where the issuance
thereof would be futile. 55 C.J.S. 36, Mandamus
Sec. 11. But that principle is never applied unless
it is "clear that no benefit can result from the issuance of the writ" (ibid.). See also, Skeen v. Pratt,
87 Utah 121, 48 P. 2d 457; Horn v. Superior Court,
94 Cal. App. 2d 283, 210 P. 2d 518. In any case,
the Pratt case was decided in 1917, more than 43
years ago. At that time the concepts that an unincorporated association as such can be adjudged
guilty of contempt and that obedience to a court's
order can be compelled by means of coercive fines
had not been developed. Insofar as the case holds
that a writ of mandamus should be denied because
of the absence of officers capable of affecting compliance therewith, it does not represent the law
today. In this connection, it is significant that although it has been cited many times in numerous
jurisdictions in support of other propositions, it has
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never been cited in support of the proposition that
a writ of mandamus should be denied because of
the absence of natural persons competent to effect
cmnpliance therewith.
But quite apart from the foregoing, the plaintiffs sought, as permitted by the Utah Rules of
Ci,·il Procedure, not only a writ of mandamus, but
abo a judgment declaring plaintiffs' expulsion to
be null and void, as well as damages. The judgment
entered gran ted the relief prayed. Even if the writ
of 1nandate were improvidently granted for want
of power to enforce it, the balance of the judgment
is unassailable on the ground and it is en ti tied to
full faith and credit throughout the United States.
The second contention urged by defendant, namely that the court erred in refusing to quash the
selTice of process on the ground that defendant is
not subject to service of process in the State of Utah,
is equally without merit. Defendant is an unincorporated association and is a resident of every
state in which it has members and carries on the
business and functions for which it was organized.
Defendant not only has members in the State of
Utah, but is also carrying on its business and functions in this State. Service of process was made
on David Turner, then an International Organizer
appointed and paid by defendant. At that time Turner was actively carrying on defendant's business
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in the State of Utah. See the affidavit of Edward
Carlough, defendant's General Secretary-Treasurer.
( R. 11-12) . In these circumstances the process was
plainly properly served under Rule 4(e) ( 4), and
Rule 17(d), URCP.
Defendant cites and relies upon W ein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P. 2d 222. It is difficult
to see what conceivable bearing that case can have
on the case at bar. It dealt with the amenability to
suit in this state of a non-resident individual under
Rule 17(e), URCP. It has nothing to do with the
amenability to suit of or with the service of process upon an unincorporated association having
members in this state and carrying on its business
and functions in this state.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY FEES.

Plaintiffs were clearly entitled to recover attorneys fees in this type of action, whether it be regarded as a proceeding in mandamus or a suit in
equity. If it be regarded as a proceeding in mandamus the allowance of attorneys fees is expressly
authorized by Section 78-35-9, UCA 1953. Colorado
Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P. 2d 914.
If the proceeding be regarded as one in equity, attorneys fees would nevertheless be recoverable. For
example, in Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376,
82

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

191 N. E. 661, an expelled member brought a suit

in equity against a trade union to have his expulsion set aside. Holding that he was entitled to recover atorneys fees, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts said:
In actions based on wrongful conduct, where
the wrong is of such character that the proper
protection of plaintiff's rights necessarily requires him to employ counsel to gain redress
of the wrong, he may recover as an element of
damage reasonable counsel fees.
The rule so laid down is in accord with the principles enunciated by this court in Spoul v. Parks,
116 Utah 365, 210 P. 2d 436.
Defendant argues, however, that attorneys fees
are recoverable only as an element of "damages",
and since the obligation of plaintiffs to pay attorneys fees was contingent upon their succeeding in
the litigation, they will not be damaged by the disallowance of attorneys fees. Defendant states in its
brief that the fee arrangement between plaintiffs
and their attorneys was incomprehensible. Although
verbal, the arrangement was not vague and uncertain as claimed by defendant. It is clear that
the fee was contingent, to be a reasonable amount
if judgment for reinstatement only was obtained
and a percentage of the amount recovered if a judgment for damages was obtained (Post-T. 4-27-59,
pp. 92, 103, 106, 115, 120-122, 130). It is probably
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incomprehensible to defendant that "a man's word
is as good as his bond". There is no merit to defendant's argument that plaintiffs will not be damaged by the payment of attorneys fees. Should plaintiffs fail in this action, they would not be entitled
to recover anything. Should they succeed, the amount
of their recovery will clearly be diminished by the
amount they must pay their attorneys. To that extent they will be damaged. Should they succeed only
in effecting their reinstatement, they would both
by express agreement and as a matter of la\v be
obligated to pay a reasonable attorneys fee. To that
extent they would be damaged.
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN TAXING CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT.

The defendant finally complains that the court
erred in taxing the fees and mileage of the witnesses
called by the plaintiffs who testified before the jury.
It maintains that since the jury returned a verdict
for the defendant as to damages after expulsion, it
was the prevailing party as to that phase of the
case within the meaning of Rule 54(d) (1) URCP,
and not the losing party within the meaning of
Section 21-51-8, UCA 1953. Accordingly, it claims
that it is not liable for the witness fees and mileage
in question. The short and complete answer to this
contention is that this is not two cases but a single
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action. On the case as a whole, plaintiffs won and
defendant lost and thus plaintiffs were the prevailing parties and are clearly en ti tied to recover the
challenged costs. Checketts v. Collins, 78 Utah 93,
1 P. 2d 950.
POINT VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

As said before, the jury returned a verdict in
faYOl' of defendant on the issues whether plaintiffs
had suffered actual damages as a result of their
expulsion, and whether because of acts of defendant and its officers committed after the expulsion
plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages. A timely n1otion for new trial was filed on the ground,
muong others, of insufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict. The court overruled the motion,
but in its order overruling the motion the court
found as follows (R. 619-620):
17. With reference to the contention of the
petitioner and intervenor that the verdict of
the jury is contrary to the evidence, the court
believes that the answers of the jury to Special Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 are in
each case contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence and that the answer to each of
said interrogatories should have been "yes".
The court also believes that the jury should
have awarded actual damages to both the petitioner and intervenor. The court believes that
the preponderance of the evidence shows :
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(a) That both the petitioner and intervenor
suffered substantial loss of income between
July 1, 1954, and the time of trial as a proximate result of their expulsion from the respondent association.
(b) That during the period mentioned employers of sheet metal workers in Nevada,
Arizona, California and Utah generally requested union clearance in employing workers.
(c) That officers of respondent's locals customarily gave preference to union members
in referring or giving clearance to men for
work and generally refused to give clearance
to expelled members of the union.
(d) That many employers of sheet metal
workers were reluctant to employ expelled
members of a union for fear of labor troubles.
(e) That, regardless of so-called right-towork laws, officers of respondent's local
unions generally gave preference to union
members in work referrals or clearances.
(f) That the respondent association has locals throughout the United States and Canada
and non-members of the union and men known
to have been expelled from the union are
seriously handicapped in obtaining or retaining employment in the sheet metal industry.
(g) That both the petitioner and intervenor
suffered very substantial loss of income by
reason of their expulsion and being known as
expelled members of the union during the
period of more than four and a half years
elapsing between the expulsion and the time
of trial.
(h) That both the petitioner and intervenor
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suffered embaiTassment and humiliation by
reason of their expulsion and being deprived
of privileges, associations and benefits of
union membership.
(i) That although a number of employers
of sheet metal workers in the Las Vegas area
had had serious labor troubles during the
time when the intervenor, Hanley, was In
te1·national Representative for the respondent
association and were consequently hostile to
him and would not give have given him employment regardless of union membership,
other employers of sheet metal workers there
and elsewhere would have given Hanley or
Nance employment if they could have obtained clearance from local union officers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, which
constitute a concise and accurate summary of the
evidence presented before the jury, the court overruled the motion because it concluded that the jury's
verdict was binding upon it. In so doing, the court
was plainly in error.
The test to be applied by a trial judge in passing upon a motion for a new trial is different from
that to be applied in passing upon a motion for a
directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the case of the latter two
motions, if there is any evidence to support the
verdict the motions must be denied; but in the case
of a n1otion for a new trial, if the judge is convinced
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the motion should be granted notwithstand87
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ing the fact that the evidence may be conflicting.
King v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 212
P. 2d 692; Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.
2d 722 (concurring opinion of Crockett, J.). Accordingly such cases at Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co.,
5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P. 2d 622; Sickle v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 122 Utah 477, 251 P. 2d 867; Heywood
v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 6 Utah 2d 155, 302
P. 2d 1045 are not applicable here.
In the present case, the trial judge having affirmatively found that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence, it was error for him not
to have granted a new trial. Thus, in Gulf Power
Co. v. Bagby, 113 Fla. 739, 152 So. 23, the trial
judge in passing upon a motion for a new trial
found that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence, but nevertheless denied the motion
because another jury in a previous trial had returned
the same verdict. The Supreme Court of Florida
held that this was reversible error, saying:
Where, however, the trial judge in his order
denying the motion for a new trial declares
on the record that in his judicial opinion that
the verdict is contrary to the probative force
and weight of the evidence, it is his duty to
give effect to that judicial determination and
award a new trial. If he declines to do so and
denies the motion, such action constitutes
error, and unless the appellate court is convinced that a new trial should not be grant88
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ed because of insufficiency of the evidence on
behalf of the prevailing party, the judgment
should be reversed.
See to the same effect: People v. Robarge, 41
Cal. 2d 628, 262 P. 2d 14; People v. Hines, 128 Cal.
App. 2d 421, 275 P. 2d 585.
Clearly, we submit, the court here erred in not
granting a new trial.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
should in all respects be affirmed, except insofar
as it denies plaintiffs' recovery of actual damages
and punitive damages for acts of defendants and its
officers committed after the expulsion, and that
as to those rna tters, and as to those matters only,
the case be remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES P. McCUNE
53 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah
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109 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada
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